


Application-Centric Security Models

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World leading research with real world impact



- World leading security modeling and analysis research
 - Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Model (1996)
 - Catalyzes dominance of RBAC in commercial systems
 - Develops into a NIST/ANSI Standard (2004)
 - Usage Control (UCON) Model (2004)
 - Attribute-Based Access Control on Steroids
 - Unifies numerous extensions/enhancements
 - PEI Framework (2000, 2006)
 - Policy, Enforcement, Implementation Models
 - From what to how
 - Group-Centric Information Sharing (2007)
 - Sharing metaphor of meeting room
 - > Equivalently: mission centric
 - Security for Social Networks (2008)
 - Botnet Analysis, Detection and Mitigation (2008)
 - Multilevel Secure Architectures (2009)
 - Secure Cloud Computing (2009)
- Bring in partners from leading research universities worldwide as appropriate
- Ready to commercialize when appropriate



- Our Basic Premise
 - There can be no security without application context
 - Courtney's Law (1970s, 1980s ??):
 - You cannot say anything interesting (i.e. significant) about the security of a system except in the context of a particular application and environment
- Corollary
 - There can be no security model without application context
- Reality
 - Existing security models are application neutral
 - > Assumption is they can be readily "configured" or "policyified" to suit application context




- Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
 - Characteristic: Owner-based discretion
 - Drawbacks:
 - Classic formulation fails to distinguish copy from read
 - > Application context drives ownership and its delegation
- Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC)
 - Characteristic: One directional information flow in a lattice of security labels
 - Also known as: Bell-LaPadula, Multi-Level Security, Mandatory Access Control (ignoring subtle differences)
 - Drawbacks: Many applications
 - Many applications violate one directional information flow
 - Many applications do not fit within preexisting security labels



- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
 - Characteristic: Role is central, administration is simple
 - Drawbacks:
 - Need to define the roles for each application/environment
 - Lack of standardized roles results in lack of interoperability
 - > Too open: can be configured to do DAC or LBAC
- Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
 - Characteristic: subsume security labels, roles and more as attributes and enforce attribute-based policies
 - Drawbacks:
 - > All the RBAC drawbacks on steroids
 - > Administrative complexity



Usage Control Model (UCON)






- DAC
- LBAC
- RBAC
- ABAC
- ... and many, many others
- UCON
 - ABAC on steroids
 - Simple, familiar, usable and effective use cases demonstrate the need for UCON
 - > Automatic Teller Machines
 - > CAPTCHAs at Public web sites
 - > End User Licencse Agreements
 - > Terms of Usage for WiFi in Hotels, Airports
 - Rate limits on call center workers




- Our Basic Premise
 - There can be no security model without application context
- So how does one customize an application-centric security model?
 - Combine the essential insights of DAC, LBAC, RBAC, ABAC and UCON in a meaningful way
 - Directly address the application-specific trade-offs
 - Within the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability
 - Across security, performance, cost and usability objectives
 - Separate the real-world concerns of practical distributed systems and ensuing staleness and approximations (enforcement layer) from the policy concerns in a idealized environment (policy layer)







- Extensive research in the last two decades ORCON, DRM, ERM, XrML, ODRL, etc.
- Copy/usage control has received major attention
- Manageability problem largely unaddressed




Dissemination Chain with Sticky Policies on Objects




Group-Centric Sharing (g-SIS)

- Brings users & objects together in a group
 - Focuses on manageability using groups
 - Co-exists with dissemination-centric
 - Two metaphors
 - Secure Meeting Room (E.g. Program committee)
 - Subscription Model (E.g. Secure multicast)
- Operational aspects
 - Group characteristics
 - E.g. Are there any core properties?
 - Group operation semantics
 - E.g. What is authorized by join, add, etc.?
 - Read-only Vs Read-Write
- Administrative aspects
 - E.g. Who authorizes join, add, etc.?
 - May be application dependent
- Multiple groups
 - Inter-group relationship






g-SIS Operation Semantics






g-SIS Operation Semantics






Family of g-SIS Policy Models





g-SIS Enforcement Model



Refresh Time (RT): TRM contacts CC to update attributes



- Additional Trusted/Semi-Trusted Servers
- Approximate Enforcement
- Finally, the Implementation layer models spell out protocol details and details of TRM algorithms



- Application-Centric Security Models require
 - State-of-the-art approaches such as UCON, PEI
 - Mix-and-match DAC, LBAC, RBAC, UCON, g-SIS

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- The future of cyber security research will revolve around
 - Application-centric models
 - Technology-centric models
 - Attack models

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